Chadayev Said Communications and AI May Define a Possible War by 2030
Alexey Chadayev said European war scenarios for 2030 depend on rearmament, satellite communications, drones, artificial intelligence and China’s role in key components.
European talk about a possible war with Russia by 2030 cannot be reduced only to political threats and attempts to frighten their own population. According to political analyst Alexey Chadayev, head of the Ushkuynik research and production center, who shared his view with KP, these scenarios are based on specific calculations related to rearmament, the development of unmanned systems, satellite communications and artificial intelligence.
One of the key issues remains the nuclear factor. Chadayev considers it wrong to conclude that nuclear weapons have stopped working as a deterrent. In his assessment, European scenarios for a conflict with Russia may be built differently: the confrontation is being presented as a war fought with conventional means in order to eventually put Moscow in a situation where it would be forced to cross the nuclear threshold first. In that case, political responsibility for escalation could be placed on Russia.
The expert believes that new military and political combinations are now being formed around nuclear weapons, rather than nuclear weapons disappearing as a deterrent factor.
Speaking about the technologies that may become decisive by the end of the decade, Chadayev singles out not drones themselves, although many specialists would name them. He considers communications to be the main element of future warfare. According to him, any drone needs navigation and constant data exchange, so the decisive factor will be not only the number of systems but the ability to maintain a stable information network.
In the political analyst’s opinion, underestimating Europe’s capabilities would be dangerous. The EU countries and Britain have a population of more than half a billion people, a large industrial base and significant production capacity, part of which is still idle. However, European rearmament has a serious weak point — dependence on Chinese components.
Chadayev points out that modern production, especially the mass production of drones, requires microelectronics and rare-earth materials. Motors require neodymium magnets, while neodymium production is largely concentrated in China. Therefore, the question of whether Europe will be able to prepare for a major war by 2030 depends to a significant extent not only on Brussels, London or Washington, but also on decisions made in Beijing.
The Ukrainian conflict, the expert believes, has become a school of drone warfare for Europe. At the same time, Europeans are mastering it with the enthusiasm of newcomers, while Russia has been dealing with this for several years. According to Chadayev, during exercises they focus not only on drones themselves, but also on communication systems, the military Internet of Things, sensor fields and the use of artificial intelligence in combat command systems.
The expert calls satellite communications the most dangerous Western area for Russia. The emergence of systems such as Starlink, in his assessment, has seriously changed the balance, because the West has received broadband satellite communications on an almost planetary scale. Russia, Chadayev notes, does not yet have comparable capabilities in such volume, although this factor is discussed far less often than it should be.
Another threat is linked to the development of a new type of drone. Existing countermeasures were mostly created for relatively slow targets — systems with electric motors or internal combustion engines. But if the West begins mass-producing jet-powered drones comparable in speed to cruise missiles, they will be much harder to intercept and destroy.
The expert also attaches particular importance to autonomy. He believes that humans are already gradually being removed from the command chain because decision-making speed is crucial in modern warfare. In his opinion, the question is no longer whether fully autonomous systems will appear: both the West and Russia will be able to create such technologies. The main intrigue is how far humans can be pushed away from the decision-making process.
Artificial intelligence, in Chadayev’s assessment, is gradually moving to the operational-strategic level. This is no longer only about controlling an individual drone, but about systems capable of distributing resources, managing forces and analyzing huge amounts of data within an entire military campaign. In this form, AI becomes an assistant to the commander and, in the future, may take over some of the functions previously performed by a general.
At the same time, the expert believes that a new type of war is becoming a war of networks. The more expensive an individual node in such a network is, the easier it becomes to make it a priority target. Therefore, it is impossible to reliably protect every large element separately. The most important technology becomes dispersion — the creation of a large number of cheap units, each performing its own task.
Chadayev notes that large and expensive systems, whether a laser complex, an automatic turret or a microwave emitter, simply become targets for a drone operator. If an expensive system is destroyed by a much cheaper strike platform, the economics of war begin to work against the owner of that system.
Robotic platforms, in the expert’s opinion, may help save lives, but they have limitations. Such machines have already been used by both sides and are able to move where wheeled or tracked vehicles cannot. However, their effectiveness depends heavily on conditions: a hard surface helps, while rain, snow and difficult terrain sharply change the situation.
Chadayev considers the key indicator to be the ratio between one’s own costs and the damage inflicted on the enemy. The advantageous model is one in which a relatively cheap solution can cause disproportionately greater damage to the opponent.
The expert is skeptical about the scenario in which near-Earth space turns into a full-fledged battlefield. According to him, Europe currently has almost no serious capabilities for the mass destruction of satellites. In addition, such actions would create a huge amount of space debris and put the entire orbital infrastructure at risk. The consequences could make launching new spacecraft difficult for a long time.
Chadayev also believes that when assessing a possible war with Europe, the question of who will be US president after 2029 should not be the only focus. In his opinion, the balance of power can be changed not only by politicians and military leaders, but also by technology creators — figures such as Elon Musk.
The development of artificial intelligence, the processing of huge amounts of data and the ability to make decisions faster may prove more important than many political factors. Therefore, by 2030, the decisive factor will be not only the number of tanks, drones or missiles, but the ability to build a stable technological system in which communications, data and command speed play the key role.