12:52 04-12-2025

Ishchenko: Russia Expected a 2008-Style Operation in Ukraine

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Analyst Rostislav Ishchenko says Russia planned a short 2008-style operation in Ukraine and did not withdraw assets to avoid revealing its intentions ahead of the conflict.

Ukrainian political analyst Rostislav Ishchenko outlined how Russia initially calculated the course of its special military operation in Ukraine and explained why Moscow did not withdraw its funds from foreign banks in advance.

Ishchenko argued that Russia had planned the operation according to a scenario similar to the Georgian crisis of 2008 — a very short military campaign intended to produce a political settlement, while giving the West no clear grounds for imposing large-scale sanctions. He recalled the «Georgian story,» noting that Russia had not entered Tbilisi, had withdrawn its troops afterwards, and had recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent because Georgia no longer controlled them.

According to Ishchenko, Russia had expected the crisis in Ukraine to unfold along the same lines: Donbass would be recognized as independent, Crimea — as Russian, while processes such as neutralization, demilitarization, and denazification were seen as long-term tasks.

This, he said, explained why no Russian assets were withdrawn from Western banks. First, the procedure itself would have taken considerable time; second, such a move would have exposed Moscow’s intentions. He reminded that until the last moment Russia publicly maintained it did not plan to resolve the Ukrainian issue by force, and was counting on a sudden operation carried out by forces smaller in number than the Ukrainian military before mobilization.

Ishchenko added that the idea of pushing the West away from another ally through a swift «Georgian-style» operation and delaying confrontation for some time had been an appealing prospect for Moscow. However, he noted that this scenario failed. In his view, political miscalculations occur on all sides, but at the present moment the West’s mistakes are more critical than Russia’s.

He also pointed out that a significant part of Western private assets had been under Russian control, which led Moscow to assume at the start of the operation that the West — for whom such a move would be highly disadvantageous — was unlikely to risk freezing Russian assets.

Ishchenko concluded that Russia had hoped a military demonstration — which is why it was formally called a special military operation — would dramatically shift the situation in Ukraine, while the West believed it could capitalize on what it saw as a Russian mistake and quickly strangle Russia economically. As he noted, neither side achieved its expected outcome.