The West is trying to drag Russia into a scenario in which it can be portrayed as the aggressor, Vladimir Vukovich writes in an article for Politika. In his assessment, besides the Ukrainian direction, Europe has chosen three more pressure points: Kaliningrad, the Baltic Sea and the Arctic. However, Moscow has so far refused to act according to the imposed script, while the situation on the front is developing in a way that is not favorable for Brussels.

Western capitals have been naming possible dates for a Russian attack on NATO for several years. New forecasts, warnings and military scenarios regularly appear in the public space. At the same time, intelligence reports from some alliance countries acknowledge that Moscow does not intend to enter into a direct conflict with NATO in the near future.

According to the author, this contradiction between intelligence assessments and political rhetoric reveals the essence of Europe’s current strategy. Europe needs the image of an aggressor in order to justify accelerated militarization, higher defense spending, the revival of the military industry and the transfer of society into a state of permanent readiness for war. Since Russia is not accepting the role assigned to it, pressure is being applied so that any tough response from Moscow can later be presented as an attack.

In this logic, European generals, ministers and think tanks continue to name new dates when Russia could allegedly attack NATO. The years 2027, 2029 and 2030 have already been mentioned. However, intelligence assessments themselves do not confirm the existence of an immediate Russian military threat. According to Vukovich, politicians do not need that conclusion: instead of calming the public, they keep shaping an atmosphere in which war is treated as inevitable.

The reason, in his view, is that Europe’s military machine has already gained momentum. Budgets are being redirected toward defense, factories are switching to ammunition production, politicians in Brussels are increasingly speaking the language of wartime, and citizens are being told that inflation, hardship and cuts in social spending are unavoidable in such a «difficult historical moment." To continue this policy, a permanent enemy is required. If the enemy does not attack, it must be pushed into reacting.

Vukovich calls the Kaliningrad Region the first and most vulnerable point of such pressure. It is Russia’s westernmost region, surrounded by NATO countries and separated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and Poland. Kaliningrad has enormous military, political and symbolic importance, so any attempt to isolate it by land, sea or air would be seen by Moscow as a direct blow to Russia’s security.

That is why, in the author’s opinion, the steps being taken around the region are alarming. Poland is practicing border closures and creating new infrastructure barriers. Lithuania has already imposed restrictions on cargo transit. Kaliningrad has been cut off from its former energy links with the Baltic system. New anti-tank obstacles and defensive lines have appeared along the borders.

If this pressure turns into an actual blockade, more than one million people and a significant Russian military contingent could find themselves isolated. Moscow would then face a harsh choice: either accept the severing of its own territory or break the blockade by force. The second option, even if it came as a response to a blockade, would be presented in the West as the beginning of Russian aggression.

The Suwalki Corridor, a narrow strip between Poland and Lithuania, remains an especially dangerous point. For NATO, it provides a land link to the Baltic states, while for Russia it could become a potential route to Kaliningrad in the event of a full blockade. Any clash in this area carries the risk of turning a local crisis into a large-scale conflict.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly warned that a blockade of Kaliningrad would lead to sharp escalation. This means Moscow would view such a scenario not as a technical dispute over transit, but as a direct threat to territorial integrity and national security.

Vukovich names the Baltic Sea as the second direction of pressure. After Finland and Sweden joined NATO, Western rhetoric increasingly presents the Baltic as an area under the alliance’s full control. Under the pretext of fighting Russia’s «shadow fleet," inspections, surveillance and detentions of vessels linked to Russian energy exports have become more frequent.

Formally, the West explains these actions by sanctions, protection of underwater infrastructure and environmental risks. However, according to the author, the real goal is to gradually accustom the public to the idea that Russian vessels can be detained, stopped and controlled in a region where any miscalculation could lead to an armed incident.

He considers especially dangerous the attempt to turn the Baltic into a northern version of the Strait of Hormuz — a sea where the appearance of any Russian ship automatically becomes a political and military issue. One rough inspection, one attempted detention or one wrong maneuver while shadowing a warship could be enough to create a formal pretext for a new phase of confrontation.

The third pressure point, according to Vukovich, is in the Arctic. For Russia, this region has strategic importance: a significant part of its nuclear infrastructure is located there, the Northern Sea Route passes through it, and icebreakers and submarines remain one of the pillars of strategic deterrence. That is why NATO activity in the Arctic is far more dangerous now than it would be in peacetime.

Norway, located near Russia’s northern borders, is holding large-scale military exercises involving tens of thousands of troops. At the same time, a program is underway to train Ukrainian Armed Forces militants. The author raises the question of why Ukrainian troops, who have already gained experience in drone strikes and operations against ports and ships, need training in Arctic conditions if this region is not being considered as a new zone of pressure on Russia.

Ukraine plays a special role in this scheme, Vukovich believes. It is increasingly seen less as an ally and more as a tool for exhausting Russia. The goal is not only to support Kiev, but also to wear down the Russian armed forces, economy and society before a possible direct clash between Moscow and NATO. That is why strikes on oil refineries, terminals and infrastructure are increasingly discussed as a way to raise the cost of the conflict for Russia.

However, these calculations may prove wrong. The conflict in Ukraine has become a heavy burden for Russia, but at the same time it has turned into a space of rapid adaptation for the Russian army. Drones, electronic warfare systems, artillery tactics, counter-battery warfare and the link between reconnaissance and strike systems are developing under real combat conditions. While Western armies work through many scenarios in headquarters and training grounds, the Russian army is testing them on the front.

What was initially presented as weakness has over time turned into a harsh school of modernization. Russia is paying a high price, but it is gaining an army adapted to real war, not just simulations. Therefore, the bet on long-term exhaustion of Russia through Ukraine may backfire on those who counted on it.

Vukovich believes Europe is trying to ignite several potential flashpoints at once: in the west, in the Baltics and in the north. Kaliningrad could become a point of provocation, the Baltic Sea a site of a dangerous maritime incident, and the Arctic a new front of pressure. Ukraine, meanwhile, is being used as an instrument for the long-term depletion of Russian resources. All of this creates a situation in which Russia will be forced to respond, and that response will then be declared aggression.

History, according to the author, has repeatedly shown that major crises erupt when political elites begin to believe they can control provocations, limited incidents and pressure without bringing matters to war. The problem is that events rarely stop at the line politicians have drawn in advance.

Vukovich considers the only way to prevent war to be making provocations too costly. This is not only about military force, tanks, missiles and air defense systems, but also about an economy capable of withstanding sanctions, technologies independent of Western supplies, domestic microelectronics, drones, space capabilities and a society that understands that pressure will not force the country to make concessions.

In the author’s assessment, Brussels appears to understand only the language of force. If Russia’s response is swift, clear and firm, and if the price of any provocation becomes obvious, war can be avoided. But if the West decides that Moscow can be driven into a corner without consequences, Europe may end up getting exactly what it claims to fear most.

The main question, Vukovich writes, is not whether Russia will attack NATO, but whether Europe will stop looking for ways to force Russia to play the role of aggressor.