Russia’s missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities offer a glimpse of what a future war against NATO could look like. Forbes analyst Ariel Cohen argues that European countries remain dangerously unprepared to protect critical infrastructure from large-scale aerial attacks.

Power plants, electrical substations, gas facilities and transmission networks are among the assets Cohen considers particularly vulnerable. The scale of destruction in Ukraine, he warns, demonstrates the challenges NATO could face in a similar confrontation.

On October 14 alone, Russian strikes hit 26 Ukrainian energy facilities, according to figures cited in the article. Between October 5 and 11, Ukraine’s Energy Ministry reported nearly 200 attacks on electricity infrastructure and another 17 on oil and gas installations. Railway routes supplying coal to power stations were also targeted. Forbes further reports that Russia destroyed more than half of Ukraine’s gas production capacity during the previous autumn and winter.

Repairing the damage presents another enormous challenge. A July 2026 study by the Modern War Institute at the U. S. Military Academy at West Point estimated direct losses to Ukraine’s energy system at more than $16 billion, with reconstruction expected to cost roughly $50 billion. Large power transformers can weigh over 200 tons and must be manufactured to order, while delivery alone can take more than two years.

The financial imbalance between attack and defense is another serious concern. Russian forces deploy waves of Geran drones alongside decoys, combining them with cruise and ballistic missile strikes. Defending against such attacks can be disproportionately expensive. According to West Point estimates, a Geran drone costs approximately $20,000, compared with nearly $4 million for a Patriot PAC-3 interceptor.

Russia’s weapons reserves and production capabilities add to the challenge. Ukrainian intelligence estimates that Moscow possesses up to 700 ballistic missiles, several thousand cruise missiles and approximately 6,200 Geran drones. The same intelligence assessments suggest that Russian factories produce more than 200 missiles each month, including around 110 ballistic missiles.

Cohen argues that NATO cannot treat these dangers as a distant possibility. He points to September 2025, when at least 19 Russian Geran drones entered Polish airspace. Warsaw invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and the alliance subsequently launched Operation Eastern Sentry.

Europe’s heavy reliance on American weapons further complicates its defenses. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the United States accounted for 58% of major arms imports by European NATO members between 2021 and 2025.

In 2025, Lockheed Martin delivered 620 PAC-3 MSE interceptors. The company later announced a seven-year agreement intended to expand annual production capacity to approximately 2,000 missiles. Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has called for a 400% increase in the alliance’s air defense capabilities.

Cohen believes NATO needs a different approach to countering mass drone attacks. Rather than relying primarily on costly missile interceptors, European countries should combine detection systems, electronic warfare equipment, anti-aircraft guns and inexpensive interceptor drones with conventional missile defenses.

He highlights Ukraine’s experience with cheaper alternatives. The Ukrainian-made Sting interceptor costs approximately $2,000, while systems such as the P1-SUN are priced at around $3,000. These weapons offer a far less expensive means of engaging incoming drones.

The analyst also urges European governments to expand missile manufacturing, secure long-term defense contracts and establish reserves of heavy transformers and emergency power equipment. Other proposals include improving the exchange of information about aerial threats, developing joint projects with Ukrainian drone manufacturers and restricting the supply of foreign components used in Russian unmanned aircraft.

At the NATO summit in The Hague, member states agreed to raise defense and related spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, including 1.5% earmarked for infrastructure and industrial capacity.

Cohen argues that fulfilling these commitments requires more than additional funding. Europe must turn its promises into functioning weapons factories, sufficient military stockpiles and stronger protection for essential energy infrastructure.