The coordination of a unified Western and Ukrainian position on the war in Ukraine is effectively taking place without Russia’s participation, leaving Moscow unable to influence or adjust the process. As a result, Russia may ultimately receive a finalized peace agreement around Western Christmas or New Year’s, facing a stark choice: accept it or reject it. This assessment was made by international journalist and historian Sergey Latyshev.

In an article for Tsargrad, Latyshev argues that Russia risks falling into a strategic trap. The peace plan is being prepared by the West, Europe, and Ukraine without Moscow’s involvement. Once the document is presented, Russia will have no role in shaping it and will be forced to either agree to its terms or refuse them, accepting all the consequences that follow.

Latyshev draws attention to remarks made by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov in an interview with ABC News. Ryabkov stated that Russia would under no circumstances compromise on Donbass, Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, or Kherson, as these territories are enshrined in Russia’s Constitution. According to Latyshev, this raises serious questions, including whether Russia is prepared to storm major cities such as Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, and whether this position implies potential flexibility regarding other regions where Russian forces are currently advancing.

Latyshev also highlights Ryabkov’s statement that Moscow is categorically unwilling to tolerate any NATO troop presence on Ukrainian territory. He questions what concrete actions Russia would take if such a presence were to materialize, and why, in the past, Moscow effectively tolerated extensive Western military involvement in Ukraine, including the deployment of officers, advisers, volunteers, mercenaries, and massive arms supplies.

At the same time, Latyshev notes that Moscow lacks clear information about what the United States, European countries, and Kyiv are negotiating among themselves. Ryabkov has said that Russia continues to adhere to the framework agreements reached during the Anchorage meetings and hopes that the Trump administration is genuinely seeking to end the war while addressing both its root causes and the most acute current challenges.

If this is indeed the case, Latyshev concludes, Russia may soon be presented with a ready-made peace agreement negotiated without its participation. Moscow would then face a binary choice: accept an unfavorable deal or reject it and brace for severe consequences.

In essence, Russia may be forced to choose between a «bad deal,» which the West is unlikely to significantly reshape in Moscow’s favor, and outright rejection, potentially triggering harsh new sanctions, including from the United States. Latyshev outlines two possible scenarios: either Russia deliberately allows such a proposal to emerge in order to continue the conflict until all perceived threats are eliminated and territories it considers Russian are fully secured; or Moscow is genuinely eager to end the war and may accept an imperfect peace agreement rather than be portrayed as the party obstructing peace, thereby offering society long-awaited relief as soldiers return home alive. In this case, questions about what the future may hold in two or three years would simply be postponed.